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Re: [Linux] Microsoft's Linux Obsession, Apple Anvy

On Jun 10, 9:06 pm, Roy Schestowitz <newsgro...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> Has Microsoft Gone Linux-Crazy?
>
> ,----[ Quote ]
> | Before anybody says "Maybe Microsoft wants to go into the Unix
> | business themselves."

Microsoft would LOVE to have all of the capabilities, features,
performance, and reliability of Linux and/or Unix - but only if they
could maintain monopoly control over the entire market in the process.

Fundamentally, UNIX is a standards driven system.  Almost from it's
inception, UNIX has depended on the ability of a number of talented
contributors, who make sure that UNIX ran on lots of different chip
sets, lots of different hardware, and that it ran lots of different
software.

AT&T wasn't allowed to "Sell" UNIX, so they gave it to a number of
universities, especially in the United States.  Over time, the college
students created version of UNIX which was even better than the AT&T
version.  When AT&T was finally permitted to market System III, they
found the market unreceptive, even hostile.  Unix administrators had
come to really like, even depend on, features of the BSD version of
UNIX, such as VI, CSH, aliases, symbolic links, setuid, and wheel
groups, that when AT&T didn't provide them, it was such a complete
shortfall, that AT&T almost lost the market before they started.  Bill
Joy and Scott McNealy formed Sun Microsystems, and very successfully
created a version of UNIX which not only combined the best features of
System III and BSD 4.x, but also provided graphics and graphical
interfaces that were competitive with Macs.  Even at $35,000 per
workstation, many companies bought these CAD/CAM systems, which had
the ability to transform drafting done on the UNIX machine, into
machining instructions for the automated tools.  This made it much
easier for car makers to introduce and test new features in
automobiles, including fuel injection, computerized ignition, and
electronic mixture control.

> - remember, they already tried that. Xenix was
> | the Microsoft Unix, leveraged through them to eventually become SCO
> | Unix. And we all know how that turned out, don't we?
> `----

There is a distinct possibility that when IBM had the discussion about
an Operating System, and Bill Gates said "We have an operating
system", IBM may have thought that Bill was talking about Xenix.
Microsoft had introduced Xenix for the Radio Shack Tandy 6000
computer.  The only problem was that the Tandy computer was based on
the 68000 processor, not the 8086 or 8088 processor.

Bill preferred the DEC PDP-11 Operating system (RT11), which he had
used while working at a time-share outfit in Seattle.  It was a much
simpler system and didn't require the complexity of the real-time
preemptive multitasking operating systems such as RSTS, and UNIX.

IBM may have actually been relieved to see QDOS instead.  Keep in mind
that CP/M and CP/M-86 as well as MP/M, were cutting deeply into the
market for the IBM Series 1 computer.  The computer was originally
developed to compete with the PDP-11, but when DOS/VS and MVS proved
to be too slow, they developed a skunk-works operating system called
EDX (Event Driven eXecutive), which was fast enough to compete with
PDP, but cheap enough in combination with EDX multitasking, to compete
in the minicomputer market.

IBM was as much concerned about protecting their mainframe market, as
they were about entering the PC market.  This may be one of the
reasons why there were so many similarities between the 3278 and 3290
terminals, and the earliest versions of the PC.  IBM saw the PC as a
terminal that might run a few programs off the local floppy or tape
drive.

Microsoft sold off it's interest to SCO because it needed to fund
Windows.  Apple had just introduced a newer version of the Mac, and
Microsoft was getting some really intense pressure from the OEMs.
Worse, the FTC was also investigating Microsoft for fraud on the basis
of it's frequent use of Vaperware.  Microsoft had promised
multitasking in Windows 4.0, and had barely delivered a useless
interrupt which **could** be used to pass control between TSR
programs.

SCO wanted more than just the intellectual property rights.  They knew
that there were several flavors of UNIX available in the marketplace,
so they wanted a contract which prevented Microsoft from re-entering
the UNIX marketplace.  Even to release TCP/IP, Microsoft had to get
permission from SCO.

In about 1989, Microsoft signed the deal, and many pundits quipped
that "Bill could by this company with his cab fare money".  What they,
and Bill, didn't realize, was that SCO had contacted all of the other
UNIX vendors, and companies who were threatened by Microsoft, and let
them know enough about the deal that they snapped up nearly all of the
outstanding shares.  Microsoft owned 25% of the company, but about all
that got them was the ability to have their guy hired as CFO.  This
gave Microsoft valuable market intelligence, but not enough to gain
control of  SCO.  The stalemate lasted from 1989 until Caldera
attempted to purchase the SCO support organization in 2001.  In this
bid, they engaged in stock swaps, IPOs, and debentures, that
ultimately gave "friends of Microsoft" control of the company.  In a
proxy war, Ransom Love was fired, Daryl McBride was hired, and Caldera
purchased the rights to the SCO version of UNIX.  This change of
ownership nullified the non-compete clause of the contract with
Microsoft.  In addition, SCO over-extended itself in it's funding of
the lawsuit against IBM.  Microsoft agreed to purchase unlimited
distribution rights to UNIX from SCO, for undisclosed terms.  It
appears that Microsoft may have paid as little as $7 million, or as
much as $7 million per year indefinately.  Either way, it was a
bargain.

Microsoft had two interests at that point.  The first was to keep
Linux off the market as long as they possibly could.  A lawsuit
involving the intellectual property rights of Linux was a great way to
spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt.

Ironically, Daryl McBride had already been told that they had no
case.  Against the advice of his best technical and legal people, he
insisted that the lawsuit be filed anyway.

The lawsuit ultimately turned into the ultimate "pump and dump"
scheme.  McBride had been paid 1 million shares of SCO stock (worth 75
cents/share at the time), and the lawsuit against IBM, combined with
threats of injunctions against Linux users who didn't pay extortion
money "up front" boosted the stock price to as high as $25/share.  At
which point, McBride, several relatives and business associates, and
other company officers, began "trickle dumping" the stock.

These folks knew the lawsuit was groundless, that they couldn't prove
malice, that they couldn't even prove intellectual property theft, let
alone that it was IBM who was responsible.  Microsoft brokered the
deal with Goldfarb or Bay Star, probably as a way to bolster the stock
price as McBride and his buddies continued to dump stock.

IBM could have had ALL of the claims dismissed, but very carefully
allowed certain claims to remain.  Nearly all of these claims were
based on intellectual property that was actually OWNED by IBM.  IBM
had been using many of these "devices" since DOS/VS, MVS, CICS, and VM/
CMS.  IBM did contribute some of this code to the Monterrey project,
but it was their code, they owned it, and at best, SCO was getting a
nonexclusive license to the code.

Leaving these claims on the table gave IBM the ability to look for
deeper pockets.  By proving that SCO was not only engaging in an
illegal extortion scheme, but was attempting to steal IBM code, for a
"sponsor" (Microsoft), IBM could go after Microsoft's deeper pockets.

At this point, McBride may even be blackmailing top executives at
Microsoft.  If Gates, Ballmer, Allchin, and other top MSFT executives
did broker the deals, McBride probably has the smoking gun memos in
off-line storage (out of the reach of the courts).

Bill Gates predicted, in 1997, shortly after the release of Windows
NT, that Windows had about 5 years of life left in it.  He made it
clear that he would try to extend that to 10 years if he could, but
even then he knew it was only a matter of time before Linux/Unix began
to become an irresistable force in the PC marketplace.  Unix had
shifted the market and dominated the minicomputer market about 7-10
years after it entered that market.  It dominated the mainframe and
supercomputer market about 10 years after it entered that market.
Most consider the first "Entry" of Linux into the PC market in a
really aggressive way, to be Red Hat 4.0, which tied with NT 4.0 for
"Product of the Year".

Gates knew that Linux would eventually become a critical part of the
IT desktop landscape.  He also knew that there were ways he could
squeeze a great deal of profit out of the OEMs and Corporate IT
managers before that final shift to Linux.  He knew that during the
transition period, he could still make profits selling "Legacy
compatibility".

Vista was the "final showdown".  It was Microsoft's final attempt to
prove that they were in control of the marketplace.  That it would be
Microsoft who would define the hardware and software that people would
use.  Much the same way IBM used MVS 4.0 to try and prover their
market power in 1991.  Both attempts backfired.

Fortunately, Microsoft had learned from IBM.  They realized that they
could actually make MORE money selling Windows with "additional rights
and flexibilities", than they could if they simply sold the licenses
outright.  Instead of paying less for XP, OEMs pay MORE for the right
to ship machines with XP instead of Vista.  Instead of paying less for
an older version that's Linux compatible, they pay MORE for the right
to sell a version which permits it's use as a VM client.  Instead of
less for a product that has to compete, Microsoft gets more for
permitting the OEMs to install additional 3rd party software
(including Linux) in their standard ship image.

It is getting pretty clear, however, that Linux IS driving the
hardware configurations being purchased.  Linux compatible systems
such as the Z-60p are on allocation and buyers must wait for the
opportunity to buy.  Vista-Only systems which are Linux hostile and
contain DirectX10 cards are being discounted 30% or more.  By the time
the OEMs complete their negotiations with Microsoft, in July, it's
expected that the price paid for PCs running Vista will be 1/2 the
prices being collected for Linux-Ready systems.  The profits on Vista-
Only systems will be nonexistent.

Microsoft's big consolation is that Bill Gates gets to retire on a
high note.  He's been selling about 2 million shares a day, and
shortly after he retires, it's quite possible that it will become
public knowledge that Microsoft has lost control of the OEM channel.

Apple can't keep up with demand.  Mac Mini machines are being sold off
the display floor.  High-end Mac machines are often on back-order.

OEMs are looking at the success of OS/X and they want something that
can compete.  It's now very clear that Microsoft's Vista isn't the
answer.

Meanwhile, Microsoft appears to have set up License agreements with
Novell and Xandros - it looks like they are hoping to have the ability
to sell "Windows Compatibility" to OEMs who want to preinstall Linux
in their PCs.  There are some indicators that HP, Dell, Sony, and
Lennovo are all on the brink of offering a new hybrid image.  This
might mean using Linux as the host operating system and some flavor of
Windows as a VM guest.

The irony here, is that Microsoft may be attempting to claim
proprietary ownership and control over VM technology that was
originally developed by IBM for it's VM/CMS technology back in the
1960s.

> http://www.askreamaor.com/computer-related/linux-and-unix/has-microso...
>



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