"Robin T Cox" <nomail@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:tO1ij.14842$O01.1249@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> On Sat, 12 Jan 2008 10:06:02 +0000, Roy Schestowitz wrote:
>
>> Security design: Why UAC will not work
>
> Principal reason: one of the first things Vista users want to do is to
> switch UAC off.
>
You are obviously another "advocate" who is incapable of reading. Here...
let me supply the part of the article that was conveniently snipped.
[QUOTE]
It's security's dirty little secret: Not having your users logged in as
ROOT or administrator will not stop malware.
There is a huge public security thrust to ensure that users are not
constantly logged on with highly privileged access. In Microsoft Windows,
this means not being logged in as a member of the administrators group or
any of the other 17 groups with admin-like privileges (for example, Power
Users). In Unix/Linux/BSD, this means not being logged in as root or bin or
whatever else is close. In the AS/400, it means not being logged in as
Qsysop or Qsecofr. For mainframes, it might mean superuser, terminal 0, or
another user label indicating special privileges.
[-QUOTE]
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