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Microsoft Confidential
Our Linux Strategy
VinodV
5/19/99
Microsoft Confidential; Â 1999, All Rights Reserved Do Not Forward without
Approval from Author.
Introduction
This document discusses both our strategy and our plans for competing with
Lmux. To understand the strategy it is important to remember the following:
- - Linux isnât most importantly a product/feature; itâs a philosophy change
- - Linux has no new specific features to co-opt
- Unlike the NC: the NC touted TCO benefits, and thus we introduced ZAK/ZAW
- Unlike the Internet: the Internet was loaded with technology changes, and
thus we invested in browser technologies and reexamined all our existing
products
The core strategic thrust of Linux is NOT an attack against some
product/feature weakness of Microsoft. Itâs an attack at the base of the
commercial software industry - Intellectual Property.
Previous threats to Microsoft (the NC, Java, etc.) have been about replacing
Microsoftâs IP with another companyâs IP that claimed some new benefit (e.g.
TCO). What differentiates Linux is that OSS attempts to extricate Intellectual
Property all together.
Since many people have proposed how to deal with Linux, we thought it might be
helpful as a thought exercise to quickly examine some of the alternative
strategies we could consider. For each we include the "fatal flaws" that make
them untenable.
1. Embrace Linux: MS APIs I Linux kernel -- release an MS version of Linux
and/or release key MSFT platform technologies on Linux (e.g. parts of Win32,
app server, etc.)
Pros: Ride the wave & try to evangelize Win32
Cons: Dramatically evangelizes Linux & may risk MSFT IP due to GPL license
issues
Fatal Flaw:
- Impossible to make this revenue neutral with Windows biz.
- Doesnât protect the "crown jewel" IP from being targeted at a later date
2. Embrace Linux: Linux APIs / MS Kernel -- try to get Linux APIâs on
Windows -- get more hardcore about POSIX subsystem on NT to capture Linux app
base
Pros: Capture some of the Linux dev mindshare by making it easy to bring Linux
apps to NT
Cons: Hurts Win32 evangelization
Fatal Flaw:
- There are no Linux apps that we covet.
3. Embrace Open Source: Publish NT Source -- release NT source code under a
license similar to Sunâs community source license
Pros: Try to capture Linuxâs evangelization benefits by publishing NT source
Cons: ISVs getting hooked on undocumented APIâs, support costs, etc.
Fatal Flaw:
- Microsoft is an IP company. Like the rest of the software industry, >90% of
our IP valuation stems from Trade Secrecy of the source code. Open Source is
mutually exclusive with Trade Secrecy. Th~s plan would instantly make the
various Win32 clones (e.g. http//www winehq.com) an order of magnitude more
capable.
4. Lower the price of Windows -- release older / stripped versions of the OS
for at lower price
Pros: Try to capture people who use Linux due to price sensitivity
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Cons: Building new versions of windows. Long-term support headaches
Cannibalization of the "real" windows?
Fatal Flaw:
- Assumes that price is the primary motivator for Linux usage. This has not
been borne out in reality.
What are the core strategies that we are going to pursue?
1. Fix our Sins
Linuxâs most immediate contribution is highlighting our sins in some key market
segments. There are already (large) investments in the company spun up to deal
with our most pressing concerns such as reliability; remote admin; etc so we
wonât spend further time describing them here. It is critical that we make
progress in these areas
Currently, Linux gains horsepower due to VASTLY exaggerated negative claims
about our abilities and corresponding VASTLY under reported positive claims
about our innovative work. We must reverse the "conventional wisdom" that UNIX
is technically superior to NT which is the foundation for Linux marketing. In
most ways, NT is superior & the technical message needs to get out.
2. Innovating, Creating New IP
(Re-)recognize that we are an IP company and that in our networked world,
functionality delivered via protocols is steadily replacing functionality
which was once delivered via APIs Thus, innovation must occur both internal
to our products, but also between computers.
Windows clients must always be able to communicate with Linux servers (and
vice-versa). However, there MUST be additional value created when a Windows
machine is touching another Windows machine. NOT doing this is akin to giving
away the Win32 APIs. Every group defining protocols needs to remember this.
Some core initiatives that are excellent demonstrations of this are:
Management - Deep, rich WMI instrumentation is an area where Windows and Win32
apps must excel. In addition to IP boundaries, Linuxâs development methodology
makes this difficult for Linux to provide leadership in breadth & uniformity
of coverage/implementation.
Storage -- Rich, structured, remotable, queriable storage dramatically raises
the bar versus todayâs basic file system functionality. The benefits to client
application vendors & server vendors are numerous and well detailed in other
presentations.
These areas demonstrate functionality that IT managers -- once theyâve tasted
it -- will (hopefully) find compelling enough to mandate across as many
systems within their computing universes as possible. Letting our protocols
become commoditized is a recipe for failure. We must innovate and keep our
great advancements to ourselves. The fine balance between protecting/financing
our innovations and interoperability will get more difficult overtime But, it
is relatively easy today.
Outside of protocols we need advancements throughout the system. Advances in
file formats (e.g., the disk structure), technology such as security, etc. are
areas that are critical for us to innovate. We need to accelerate patenting
every invention
3. Form Factor Proliferation
This is a well-discussed area. Obviously PCâs will not be the exclusive center
of computing in the near future and this addition to the OS requirements list
provides the opening for low innovation competitors such as Linux in. We need
to spread our technology everywhere And where we donât have our OS present,
we need to ensure the protocols are not IP latent and in fact open for us to
use.
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4. Compete with Linux Head-On
BED marketing is currently making the transition towards engaging Linux as a
tier-1 competitor in the server & client markets. There are still some
decisions to be made here (and headcounts to fill) to ensure that on a
tactical basis, NT out markets Linux Some of the core deliverables include
white papers, benchmarks, etc. More peripheral questions / issues include
reclaiming retail shelf-space from Linux, etc We need engagement throughout
the company (e g, retail) on this. Finally, getting the word out on NTâs
architectural advantages over Linux is an imperative.
5. Getting Credit for the Openness and Availability of our Sources
One of the key lessons learned from the Linux OS is the power of the Open
Source model with respect to creating passionate, technically savvy
development communities around a body of code. Reclaiming the hobbyist
developer / "scratch an itch" developer communities is paramount for us (they
were the original "long hairs" who introduced the PC to corporate America).
While we may never be able to fully detract from Linuxâs energy in this space,
it is very important for us to focus our TREMENDOUS developer relations assets
into this new "channel." JimAll presented a plan at the 3yr review that
involved a 2-pronged attack on this channel:
a. Depth Licensing -- Ramping up full, formal source code licenses to
ISVs/IHVs/Corps etc. by at least a factor of 10 vs. todayâs efforts.
b Breadth Licensing -- Reorganizing & creating new widely licensed, derivable,
redistributable source code bases hosted on web sites targeting specific Win32
developer nicheâs (e.g., ResKit level functionality).
6. Securing our Current & Future IP
Once again, the core of the Linux phenomena -- and the #1 reason it tries to
claim the "glow of inevitability" -- is itâs aversion to Intellectual Property
(IP). Obviously, in terms of economic effects, IP is on par with motherhood &
apple pie in its role in the world economy.
The belief that the "Open Source" pie will eventually gobble up ingredients
from all the other pies is more dangerous to us & the software industry than
the current Linux product
Open Source development is the greatest cloning machine of all time.
Consequently, we must recognize that "Trade Secrecy" of source code will
provide increasingly minimal protection over time and that aggressive patent
procurement is our only investment defense. Additionally, strong patent
procurement is a key enabler which allows us to publish more of our source
code to leverage evangelization benefits (the patent application process is,
in a manner of speaking, a form of source publication)
Initiatives (NOT discussed further in this paper) are underway to understand
the options in this space.
Immediate Next Steps:
The following are all underway:
1. Ramp-up / staff Linux competitive marketing efforts.
2. Ramp-up source licensing initiatives. DRG/MSDN is the owner for the umbrella
but all component teams must begin evaluating what codebases would benefit the
platform if they were evangelized via less restrictive licensing.
3. More proactively & aggressive secure patent rights to MSFT innovations that
will be significant to the OSS fight. Development teams must shift mindsets
from source code secrecy towards patents as the primary means of securing our
key innovations.
4 [on-going] Create new IP in base scenarios - file sharing, management, etc.
Please direct any questions / discussion to VinodV
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