__/ [ Rex Ballard ] on Thursday 12 April 2007 18:44 \__
>>From the Iowa Case
> http://edge-op.org/iowa/www.iowaconsumercase.org/010807/PLEX_0411_A.pdf
>
> <quote>
>>From nathanm Mon Oct 01 ll;42:05 1990
> To: bilIg bradsi jerenbyu joachimk mlkhiali paulos riscpc steveb
> Subject: SPARC. MIPS & Compaq
> Date Tue Oct 02 22:57:I4 1990
>
> Recent events show that we are more in danger than ever of losing the
> key early ground to SPARC,
> which puts our long term systems business in serious doubt. Compaq is
> considering SPARC, as well
> as friendlier options, and now Olivetti is too.
>
> At present we are paralysed because Compaq is reluctant to take the
> kind of role that is required to push
> our software and combat Sun in a reasonable way. They want to push
> UNIX (they'll relent to giving us
> equal billing, but they will expend major effort in making UNIX
> successful), they are considirng
> SPARC, and they are considering a number of [bacstrung too] SPARC
> responses.
>
> There is considerable sentiment that we should adopt a strategy of
> appeasment toward Compaq. This
> means not pushing any other strategy for fear that it will enrage them
> and push them to SPARC. If we succeed in appeasing them, we'll have
> their halfhearted support, and if they go with SPARC or a poor man's
> SPARC strategy, then we lose our systems business.
>
> There is no point in pissing Compaq off deliberately, but we should
> adopt the following plan:
>
> 1. Give our hardware design to MIPS. They would license it openly,
> including licensing the ASICs, to the semiconductor partners and the
> bord design to OEMs. MIPS would be the official source - we
> would not have MS copyrights or anything else to the stuff. This is
> not a deadly secret, it's just that
> there is no point in being high profile about it. People may assume
> that we had input because of our
> software role, but MIPS will be viewed as the source by almost
> everybody.
>
> Not that our design has a large advantage over things that MIPS has
> done in the past (or the DEC
> design) is that it can be build cheaper, and it allows you to triviall
> add any PC style bus or chips (EISA,
> MCA, etc) because one of our chips mimics the goal of the 486 bus.
> ...
> 4. Concurrent with MIPS pushing this hardware platform to OEMs, we
> would deliver the following software message to most relevant OEMs
> (see below for list). The message is:
> - We will have an NT Windows binary application standard for the R4000
> MIPS with our byte ordering. It
> is our primary RISC strategy, and we will not put it on SPARC.
>
> -Th esimplest way to get this app level binary standard is that we
> will have a system software release of
> NT Windows for the MIPS reference platfor - if you buy the standard
> chip set and board design from
> the various vendors, there is no adaptation work.
> [snip]
> 5. Our goal is to shoot for an announcement by the end of this year,
> or early next year. We may want to pull this up in fact. MIPS should
> announce their hardware reference platform independent of us, but
> either just before, or just after our announcement. Our message would
> be:
>
> - We would formally announce Win32, and make sure that a portion of
> the announcement mentioned x86 as well.
>
> - We would announce the creation of the Win32/MIPS binary standard
> duscussed in point 4 above. We would publically hit on each of the
> points menioned there.
>
> - We could get a list of OEMs to come up on stage and announce their
> support.
>
> - SDKs would be available in 91 and the product would ship in early
> 92.
>
> - The positioning of the machines is as the world's fastest Windows
> machines. We could make a big
> deal about source compatibility between x86 and MIPS for OS/2 2.0
> server apps and for Win32 apps.
>
> - The tone of the MIPS side would be that RISK offers some unique
> advantages for a specialized part of
> the Windows market where people need very fast desktop machines. We
> would NOT create any
> expectation that they would take over the earth. We would show our
> slide that shows 486 fastest for existing apps and this platform is
> great for new apps, but slow on existing apps. It's really a balanced
> future oriented message.
> [snip]
> - We would also talk about the OS/2 3.0 kernel that is underneath NT
> Windows, how it is an industrial
> strength kernel for servers etc. and it will serve advanced desktops
> etc.
>
> - Our announcement would not include SCO or push any UNIX standard.
> We could say that UNIX addresses a present, well defined market, that
> has little if any overlap with the mainstream Windows desktop market.
> It is nice that this specialized system is available on the same
> hardware as NT Windows, and for customers in that market, it might be
> the right choice. Our simple goal is the realm of Windows Computing.
> Over the next several years it will expand to include applications
> that require the performance that the R4000 can deliver, and we are
> taking steps to make sure that this is possible.
>
> The purpose of announcing early like this is to freeze the market at
> the OEM and ISV level. In this
> respect it is JUST like the original Windows announcement. This time
> we have a lot better development
> team, so the nime between announce and ship will be a lot smaller.
> Nevertheless we need to get our
> message out there.
>
> One might worry that this will help Sun because we will just have
> vaporware, that people will stop
> buying 486 machines, that we will have endorsed RISC but not
> delivered. After thinking about this, I
> think that this is emphatically NOT the case:
>
> - We answer the charge of 'vaporware' by pointing at Windows, (after
> all, we are porting it). Windows is shipping a zillion copies an hour
> and that isn't vapor at al. Every Win 3 sold and every new Windows
> app is a nail in Sun's coffin. We would go on a PR offensive with
> exactly that mission. The big news
> is that now that MIPS will have Windows, and gain all of the momentum
> that is building - how can Sun survive? So, Scott, do you really
> think you can fight that avalanche?
>
> - The "Osborne effect" is not relevant here. A long term
> announcement for MIPS based Windows in 92 will NOT frees the end user
> market. It is just an endorement that Windows has a future - it is
> too far off to hurt immediate sales, and in fact it will help. The
> original Windows announcement did not hurt DOS sales because people
> decided to wait for it. The only time when you get into an Osborne
> effect is when your announce something near term that is a viable
> alternative.
> [snip]
> 6. We would embark on a PR campaign mentioned above to reinforce the
> notion that Windows was
> the desktop API for the next 10 years, just as Dos was for the first
> 10 years. Sun and others that covet the desktop would have to beat
> Windows - and who can do that? This should be a real push - analysts,
> ISVs, etc. We would really go on the offensive about how strong
> Windows is, and how irrelevant Sun and others are as would be
> challengers.
> </quote>
Doug posted it some time ago, with reference to the intend to "freeze the
market". Since then, I have been using it to show that vapourware tactics at
Microsoft are systematic (so there are some copies of this on the World Wide
Web).
> Was this memo caughed up when Judge Jackson was issuing the 1993
> ruling?
>
> In retrospect. Microsoft did issue Vaporware announcements, and Bill
> took on the offensive even more, claiming that NT would be "A better
> Linux than Linux". NT development too much longer than stated in this
> memo. NT 3.1 was released in late 1993 and NT 3.5 was released a few
> months later. The product was a terrible disappointement, but then
> Gates announced "Chicago" as vaporware.
>
> NT 3.1 and NT 3.5 were ported to MIPS, PPC, and SPARC, but none of the
> applications were ported, making the port itself irrelevent. The
> Pentium provided the desired performance gains, and Microsoft pretty
> much used the RISC ports as a way to drain would-be UNIX vendors of
> valuable resources and time, giving Microsoft the time to tighten it's
> grip on the Windows OEMs, especially Compaq, HP, and Dell. In 1990,
> Dell was looking at SCO Unix. HP had just purchased Apollo, and
> Compaq was looking
> to license Sun's hardware and OS. The NT vaporware announcement
> convinced all three vendors to stop offering UNIX (possibly as part of
> the negotiations for Windows?).
>
> A stable version of Windows NT wasn't available until Windows NT with
> Service Pack 3, which wasn't available until October of 1997, nearly 7
> years after this memo was written. And even then, the market
> acceptance was so cold that Microsoft offered free upgrades to Windows
> 2000. Windows 2000 was almost as reliable and powerful as what Sun
> was offering in 1990, but the fraud and vaporware campaign had
> successfully prevented the market from switching to UNIX, even if the
> face of hourly Windows 3.0 crashes, Bi-hourly Windows 3.1 crashes,
> daily Windows 95 reboots, and even weekly Windows 2000 mandatory
> reboots.
>
> Sun offered the security and stability of Unix. Even Windows Vista
> cannot measure up to the level of security available on Unix
> Workstations sold during the 1990s.
Just to add something that refers to arguments from resident trolls...
NT influenced by Unix
,----[ Quote ]
| (Gates:) "And through Windows NT, you can see it throughout the design.
| In a weak sense, it is a form of Unix. There are so many of the
| design decisions that have been influenced by that environment. And
| that's no accident."
`----
http://aplawrence.com/Unixart/gates_quote.html
--
~~ With kind regards
Roy S. Schestowitz | "I blame God for making me an atheist"
http://Schestowitz.com | Open Prospects ¦ PGP-Key: 0x74572E8E
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