After takin' a swig o' grog, Roy Schestowitz belched out
this bit o' wisdom:
> Microsoft?s Monopoly Power in the Operating Systems Market
>
> 59. Throughout the Class Period, Microsoft has had monopoly power in the
> relevant market for operating systems. Findings of Fact of ¶ 33. Microsoft can
> and has exercised this power by charging a price for its Intel-compatible PC
> operating system software that is substantially above that which could be
> charged in a competitive market, and it can and has done so for a significant
> period of time without losing business to competitors.
"Linux is free, and yet it's still at 1% after 17 years," flatty
snivelled.
> Microsoft?s Monopoly Power in the Word Processing Applications Market
>
> 61. It would be prohibitively expensive for new Intel-compatible word
> processing applications software to attract enough consumers to become a
> viable alternative to a dominant incumbent in less than a few years.
> Microsoft?s Monopoly Power in the Spreadsheet Applications Market
>
> 64. It would be prohibitively expensive for new Intel-compatible spreadsheet
> applications software to attract enough consumers to become a viable
> alternative to a dominant incumbent in less than a few years.
>
> 65. Throughout the Class Period, Microsoft has had monopoly power in the
> relevant market for spreadsheet applications software. Microsoft can and has
> exercised this power by charging a price for its Intel-compatible PC
> spreadsheet applications software that is substantially above that which could
> be charged in a competitive market, and it can and has done so for a
> significant period of time without losing business to competitors.
Well, at least OpenOffice has been able to make some small inroads
nonetheless.
> SOFTWARE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
>
> 68. Microsoft has used its monopoly in the operating system market to dictate
> the terms and conditions trader which OEMs are engaged, on Microsoft?s behalf
> and as Microsoft?s agent, to communicate Microsoft?s offers of end-user
> licenses to purchasers of PCs. OEMs have no choice but to accede to
> Microsoft?s demands. Because of Microsoft?s monopoly, both the OEMs and
> Microsoft believe that there does not exist a single, commercially viable
> alternative to the pre-installation of Microsoft operating systems on PCs
> manufactured and sold by OEMs. Conclusions of Law, 87 F. Supp. 2d a 37.
> Because OEMs have no other viable choice, Microsoft effectively forced OEMs to
> preinstall Microsoft operating systems on their PCs and to jointly act with
> Microsoft to offer end-user licenses for acceptance or rejection by customers
> under terms strictly and exclusively dictated by Microsoft. As an example of
> Microsoft's domination and control of the OEM distribution channel, Microsoft
> strictly limits the freedom of OEMs to add to, delete from, or modify the
> operating system, its start-up sequence, or the content and appearance of the
> Windows desktop.
"Linux is free, and yet it's still at 1% after 17 years," flatty
snivelled.
> 71. Contrary to software industry practice and what had been Microsoft?s
> practices prior to the Class Period, end-users who purchased new PCs through
> the OEM distribution channel during the Class Period were anti-competitively
> (a) prevented by Microsoft from effectively returning the Microsoft operating
> system for a refund (notwithstanding the terms of Microsoft?s end-user
> license), (b) prohibit by Microsoft from installing on their new PCs the
> Windows operating system on their existing PC, and (c) prohibited by Microsoft
> from re-selling on a stand-alone basis the Windows operating system
> products which they purchased with their new PCs.
"Linux is free, and yet it's still at 1% after 17 years," flatty
snivelled.
> 73. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered a
> final judgment in Microsoft I on August-21, 1995, which barred several
> anti-competitive terms in Microsoft?s agreements with OEMs. Prohibited
> contract provisions included: "per processor" license provisions, ...
> As described in more detail below, Microsoft was able to devise
> *other* anticompetitive provisions in its OEM and other agreements that
> had the same exclusionary effect as the conduct prohibited in the 1995
> final judgment.
>
> 74. In 1997, the United States sought to have Microsoft held in contempt
> ...
>
> 82. Notwithstanding the final judgment in Microsoft III, the economic effects
> of Microsoft?s anti-competitive conduct alleged herein continue unabated.
> Indeed, nothing in the final judgment required Microsoft to lower prices for
> its operating systems software or otherwise eliminate the embedded overcharge
> in the operating systems market resulting from years of monopolistic conduct,
> and there is no indication that Microsoft has undertaken such a price
> reduction of its own volition. To the extent the final judgment has any effect
> in lowering the applications barrier to entry (and perhaps re-injecting
> competition in the operating systems market), any tangible impact on prices
> for operating systems is years away, at best.
"Linux is free, and yet it's still at 1% after 17 years," flatty
snivelled.
Ye gods, what a record, I grow fatigued.
--
Violence is a sword that has no handle -- you have to hold the blade.
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