-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Corporate lobbying against free software
,----[ Quote ]
| Itâs rare to find, then, a brochure produced
| with the intent of talking down free software
| as a whole. However, Wikileaks has turned up
| just such a document: the SirsiDynix brochure
| against âopen sourceâ library software,
| distributed on a restricted basis to certain
| customers. In particular, theyâre raging
| against the likes of Evergreen and Koha. I
| should own up that Iâve known one particular
| Koha developer, MJ Ray, for a long while, but
| this isnât an area I particularly have a lot
| of direct experience. If I were a Koha
| developer, though, reading this would be a
| bit smarting: they accuse it of many things,
| in particular of having priorities belonging
| in the 80s.
`----
http://www.alexhudson.com/blog/2009/10/30/corporate-lobbying-against-free-software/
Hudson: Corporate lobbying against free software
http://lwn.net/Articles/359669/rss
Recent:
UK MoD Manual of Security Volumes 1, 2 and 3 Issue 2, JSP-440, RESTRICTED, 2389 pages, 2001
,----[ Quote ]
| The main threats of this type are posed by
| investigative journalists, pressure groups,
| investigation agencies, criminal elements,
| disaffected staff, dishonest staff and computer
| hackers. The types of threat from these sources
| can be categorized in six broad groups: a.
| Confidentiality. Compromise of politically
| sensitive information. This threat is presented
| by: (1) Pressure groups and investigative
| journalists attempting to obtain sensitive
| information. (2) Unauthorized disclosure of
| official information (leaks)..."
|
| "Investigative journalists have exploited
| personal tax information; they also target
| commercial and financial information as do
| criminal elements seeking financial advantage. "
|
| [..]
|
| "The threat to operations against these targets
| is less likely to arise from positive acts of
| counter-espionage, than from leakage of
| information through disaffected members of staff,
| or as a result of the at tentions of an
| investigative journalist, or simply by accident
| or carelessness. 1706. In this wider definition
| of Threat, the "enemy" is unwelcome publicity of
| any kind, and through any medium. The most
| effective safeguard is to reinforce those aspects
| of security that minimise the risk of leakage of
| sensitive intelligence operations or product into
| the public domain - whether by accidental
| exposure or deliberate intent. The STRAP System
| aims to achieve this."
|
| [..]
|
| "The security measures in this chapter are aimed
| primarily to cover contacts made in CSSRAs and
| have been drawn up to protect the individual from
| action by FISs, extremist groups, investigative
| journalists and criminals."
|
| [..]
|
| "An Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) is issued to
| all Government Departments giving generic
| statements as to the main sources of Threat. This
| will include personnel who may be from or
| influenced by Foreign Intelligence Services
| (FIS), authorized users who, for whatever motive,
| may seek to gain access to official information
| they have no 'need to know', subversive or
| terrorist organizations, and investigative
| journalists."
|
| [..]
|
| "The threat from subversive or terrorist
| organisations, investigative journalists and
| others must also be considered."
|
| "Experience has shown that at least half the
| attempts to hack into systems arise from this
| group and that external hackers use "social
| engineering" techniques to trick authorised users
| into revealing information which may aid an
| external penetration. 7. The Media. Investigative
| journalists are increasingly interested in State
| IT systems, particularly those operated by the
| police and the Security and Intelligence
| agencies. There has been evidence of premeditated
| attempts to acquire protectively marked
| information from IT systems. 8. Members of the
| Public. The fact that inform ation held
| electronically may be open to novel forms of
| surreptitious attack provides a special
| attraction to certain individuals, commonly known
| as 'hackers'. Whilst the efforts of hackers are
| unlikely to be directed specifically against
| protectively marked information, there is added
| kudos in breaking into Defence systems, so much
| information might be discovered fortuitously. "
|
| "..The threat from subversive and terrorist
| organizations, criminal activity, investigative
| journalists, and members of the public cannot be
| discounted..."
|
| "..Malicious software can originate from many
| sources such as disaffected staff, foreign
| intelligence services, investigative journalists
| or terrorists..."
|
| [..]
|
| "..The main elements of the Audio security threat
| are: a. The threat from deliberate attempts to
| overhear conversations posed by FIS (especially
| at locations overseas), sophisticated terrorist
| and subversive organisations and in particular
| from criminals, investigative journalists,
| private investigators and some members of the
| public..."
|
| [..]
|
| "..Identify possible threats to your site, such
| as from: Foreign Intelligence Services. Terrorist
| groups. Disaffected staff. Criminals.
| Investigative journalists."
`----
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/UK_MoD_Manual_of_Security_Volumes_1%2C_2_and_3_Issue_2%2C_JSP-440%2C_RESTRICTED%2C_2389_pages%2C_2001
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
iEYEARECAAYFAkrtiSMACgkQU4xAY3RXLo6IUgCdGpj6HKgjA9S7dVd93whmThYP
C7QAn2nKNMA8WUq+Ver4Y+LjAlCOxqkq
=2IpG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
|
