nessuno@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <nessuno@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> espoused:
> Being somewhat unfamiliar with the technical aspects of the issue,
> what I ask myself is this: Is this episode an example of poorly
> implemented DRM that would obviously be broken in short order, or is
> it in principle *impossible* to construct a DRM method that cannot be
> broken? Whatever the answer to the second question, it certainly
> appears that the answer to the first question is "yes", if all you
> needed was one stupid 128-bit number, stored on the disks in question,
> to break the code.
I think the question comes down to practicalities, in fact, to the
economics of encryption. Any encryption method needs to be sufficiently
inexpensive that it does not make playback equipment inordinately
expensive. This means that there is a significant limit on the
complexity of the encryption which might be used.
My suspicion is much as your suggestion above, that it is *impossible*
to create an unbreakable code, however, it is possible to make them very
difficult to break. When considering encryption, one has to consider
that there are several routes to a solution, not necessarily just a
brute-force route, although that's the one most commonly used at the
moment as computers are far more powerful than most playback equipment
can afford to be for "on the fly" decryption.
For example, if you are struggling to break the code, why not, if you're
a well-funded criminal organisation, bribe or otherwise compel a film
studio employee to provide the required key?
>
> I guess the answer regarding the technical possibilities of DRM is
> that you can't make a really effective DRM method in software alone,
> you must also have control of the hardware. Which is the trend, of
> course, with the help of Microsoft. Another reason not to have a
> monopoly, in either software or hardware; another reason to be
> grateful that the DMCA is the law of one country only, etc.
>
>
I think you need more than control of just the software and hardware,
you need control of the complete distribution chain of the film, *as
well as* the complete distribution chain of the hardware. You need to
have employees who are impossible to corrupt, and you need to have
security in all plants which is 100% unbreakable. You need to
manufacture equipment which is impossible to disassemble in such a way
that keys can be found and/or detected.
It still comes to no avail, though, in terms of controlling copying,
because you need to prevent any usable /output/ from being available.
At the worse possibility, people will just build a home telecine
machine, like those the broadcasters used to use for broadcasting film
over television. Basically, you point a TV camera at the film as it
plays back - or in this case, you point your video camera at the monitor
screen.
What I'm trying to say here is that there is /always/ a weak link in the
security chain. There is only one way to keep a secret - do not tell
anyone in the first place. Or, as per the "Bob" black adder, kill
everyone on the planet.
--
| Mark Kent -- mark at ellandroad dot demon dot co dot uk |
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